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How Irrational Actors in the CEO Suite 
Affect Corporate Governance 
 
By Renee Jones August 3, 2017 
Recent news of sexual harassment and other legal controversies at Uber and throughout Silicon 
Valley serves as a vivid reminder that irresponsible and unethical conduct continues across the 
corporate landscape. Revelations of serious transgressions by senior corporate leaders belies a 
central assumption underlying contemporary corporate law theory. Much of corporate law is 
premised on rational actor theory – the idea that the law should be designed to leverage each 
person’s propensity to act in his rational self-interest. Corporate theorists have invoked this idea 
to promote a legal regime that relies on a system of incentives to cajole, but not command, 
corporate executives to act in the interests of shareholders and society. 
Despite its broad acceptance, the assumption that corporate executives always behave rationally 
is not well-supported by empirical evidence. Behavioral economists have demonstrated, for 
example, that people often act in a predictably irrational manner. Observable cognitive biases 
such as over-optimism often lead us to stray far from the path of rationality. In response to this 
critique, rational actor theorists contend that the number of irrational actors in the corporate 
world is likely so small that their potential impact on corporate conduct can safely be ignored. 
They further argue that the economic equivalent of a natural selection process will prevent 
irrational actors from reaching positions of authority before they can significantly influence their 
corporations. 
My forthcoming article, The Irrational Actor in the CEO Suite: Implications for Corporate 
Governance, challenges this analysis. It explores how policies based on the rational actor model 
are likely to play out when we accept the possibility that a non-trivial number of senior corporate 
executives have personality traits consistent with an irrational approach to risk. The article draws 
on psychology and neuroscience research that shows risk-related decisions are dominated by our 
emotions, rather than a rational thought process. More important, research shows that many 
individuals have a dysfunctional approach to risk that leads them to engage in self-destructive 
conduct. I adopt the term “antisocial risk takers” to describe those with a propensity to act in 
ways that are inimical to their own interest and the interests of society. 
The article reviews research in psychology and neuroscience into why some people engage in 
antisocial risk – actions in which the expected costs outweigh the expected benefits. Researchers 
have identified a trait labeled impulsivity that correlates with various forms of anti-social risk. 
Psychologists regard impulsivity as a stable personality trait that can affect one’s behavior in a 
variety of settings. Studies show that antisocial risk takers – smokers, substance abusers, and 
gambling addicts – systematically make disadvantageous choices in lab-administered gambling 
tasks. Antisocial risk takers also tend to discount future rewards and punishments more steeply 
than control subjects. 
Scientists probing the biological basis of risk taking conclude that a common neural mechanism 
underlies various forms of antisocial risk. They focus on the brain’s dopamine reward system as 
playing a key role in the development of addiction. The same brain mechanisms that contribute 
to addiction influence our approach to financial risk. Neuroscience studies of financial decision-
making, including studies of professional traders, connect biomarkers consistent with a moderate 
approach to risk with long-term investment success. These studies conclude that excessive risk 
taking and excessive caution are both associated with investment mistakes. 
A separate line of research explores the impact of CEO personality on corporate conduct. These 
studies focus on two CEO personality traits, psychopathy and narcissism, believed to contribute 
to recent major corporate scandals. Researchers have found that a surprising number of corporate 
managers have personality traits linked to antisocial risk. One well-known study found that 4 
percent of a sample of 200 managers from seven major companies met the clinical definition for 
psychopathy – a rate four times higher than among the general population. Another study found a 
higher incidence of certain personality disorder traits among a sample of British executives than 
among a comparison sample of psychiatric patients and individuals incarcerated as criminally 
insane. Other studies link high levels of narcissism in corporate CEOs to high-risk decisions, 
performance volatility, and fraud. This research shows that individuals with high levels of 
psychopathic and narcissistic traits do manage to attain positions of authority in firms where they 
can affect corporate policy and strategy. It therefore seems critical for investors, directors, and 
regulators to closely monitor executive conduct and remain vigilant for signs of unethical 
behavior and excessive risk. 
Of greater concern from a policy perspective is the danger that corporate governance practices 
premised on rational actor theory have made the corporate environment more inviting for 
individuals with high levels of antisocial traits. Consider, for example, incentive compensation 
schemes, like performance bonuses, option grants, and trading commissions. These approaches 
link an employee’s compensation and wealth to short-term corporate returns. Such policies will 
appeal most strongly to impulsive individuals who favor immediate rewards over larger, delayed 
returns. As previously discussed, psychologists link impulsivity to a range of self-destructive 
behavior, including substance abuse, problem gambling, and the failure to comply with social 
norms. Thus, the widespread adoption of incentive compensation schemes may have the effect of 
attracting seriously troubled individuals to firms. As individuals with high levels of antisocial 
traits are drawn to corporations, their attitudes and actions will likely drive away more grounded 
individuals, leading to an ethical downward spiral. 
I conclude by recommending policies and practices corporations can adopt to prevent antisocial 
risk takers from rising through their ranks, starting with consistent resume verification and 
reference checks to prevent imposters from gaining entry to firms. Firms also should vigorously 
enforce conduct codes and maintain a comprehensive system for performance evaluations to root 
out unethical and unscrupulous employees. I also identify several forms of executive behavior 
that appear to correlate with fraud. Drawing on accounts of the conduct of corporate executives 
embroiled in scandal at firms like Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and Bear Stearns, I urge investors, 
directors, and enforcement officials to pay close attention to reports of substance abuse, improper 
workplace relationships, and violations of law by senior executives. Such flagrant instances of 
personal misbehavior may be an early warning sign of fraud. The recent reports of aberrant 
executive behavior at Uber and other Silicon Valley firms provide additional data points for 
future analysis, and additional reason to doubt the prescriptive utility of rational actor theory. 
This post comes to us from Professor Renee Jones at Boston College Law School. It is based on 
her recent paper, “The Irrational Actor in the CEO Suite: Implications for Corporate 
Governance,” available here. 
 
